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DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND LIABILITIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACTS AND CORPORATION LAW
*Elliott Goldstein
**Michael L. Shepherd
Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep
in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run
at least twice as fast as that!***
Introduction
The concern of directors for their possible personal liability for corpo-
rate actions has diminished in intensity since the early 1970s., A diligence
wrought by a growing respect for potential liability,' coupled with preven-
tive measures 3 and directors' wide use of indemnification rights and liabil-
ity insurance4 are among factors serving to reduce apprehensions. How-
ever, directorial responsibilities under state corporation statutes, common
law rules,5 the Securities Act of 1933 (the '33 Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the '34 Act)' continue to be augmented, notably
through director-oriented settlements in well-publicized SEC consent de-
crees entered against numerous corporations and their boards.7 To para-
* Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, Georgia; B.S. (1936) University of Geor-
gia; LL.B. (1939) Yale University; member of Georgia and District of Columbia Bars.
** Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, Georgia; A.B.J. (1966) University of
Georgia; M.A. (1968) John Hopkins University; M.B.A. (1970), J.D. (1978) Columbia Univer-
sity; Member of Georgia Bar.
*** Carroll, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss, Chap. 2 (1871).
1 Two oft-cited cases which triggered reappraisal of directorship liabilities are Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and Felt v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
2 There are at least 133 grounds for suing a director for actions he might take or fail to
take. See KNEPPER, LIAILrrY OF OFFICERS AN DIRECTORS § 1802, at 558 (1978). See also Farrell
& Murphy, Comments on the Theme: "Why Should Anyone Want to be a Director?" 27 Bus.
LAW. 7 (1972). Insurance statistics indicate that claims against corporate directors have
increased 300% in 1974-1979. See Article, End of the Directors' Rubber Stamp, Bus. WEEK
72, 73 (Sept. 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as End of Rubber Stamp].
See, e.g., PRACTICING LAW INsTITuTE, PROTECTING THE CORPORATE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR
FROM LIABIuTY (1978); Note, Framework for the Allocation of Prevention Resources with a
Specific Application to Insider Trading, 74 MICH. L. REV. 875 (1976).
See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and
Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993 (1978). See also A.B.A. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes
in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of Corporate Personnel, 34
Bus. LAW. 1595 (1979). Some 95% of the top 1,000 United States corporations now carry
director and officer liability insurance, compared with only about 60% in 1974, and annual
premiums approximate $125 million. End of Rubber Stamp, supra note 2, at 73.
See text accompanying notes 106-79 infra.
When referred to collectively, the '33 Act and the '34 Act will be termed the Securities
Acts. See text accompanying notes 26-105 infra.
7See, e.g., SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
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phrase the Red Queen's admonition to Alice, their evolving responsibilities
demand directors' redoubled efforts if they are to remain sufficiently aware
of liabilities their actions may entail.,
Directors' duties and liabilities are now complicated by new concerns
about how boards, increasingly staffed by outside directors,' should act as
instruments of corporate governance in a time of rising societal expecta-
tions of private industry.' While the SEC and private plaintiffs increas-
ingly have influenced directors' behavior through federal securities ac-
tions,'0 corporate governance matters in large part remain a function of
state law. Indeed, the Supreme Court continues to signal plaintiffs that the
corporation statutes and common law, rather than the Securities Acts, are
the proper grounds for many corporate governance disputes."
Since the limits of legal controls on directors have been abundantly
stressed," a review of the current status of directorial duties and liabilities
is timely. To this end, this article addresses seriatim the general functions
of directors in practice, and how the Securities Acts, corporation statutes,
and common law impose specific duties and responsibilities on corporate
94,807 (D.D.C. 1974) (consent decree by which Mattel, Inc. was to name majority of
independent -SEC approved directors to its board to help prevent future violations of
Securities Acts). See generally Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1779 (1976); Treadway, SEC Enforcement Techniques: Expanding and
Exotic Forms of Ancillary Relief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Treadway]. Cf. Note, The Appropriate Remedy for Breach of an SEC Settlement Agreement,
51 TEMP. L. Q. 127 (1978).
1 "More than two thirds of all company boards and seven out of ten billion dollar in-
dustrial boards are now dominated by outsiders." Heidrick & Sruggles, The Changing Board:
Profile of the Board of Directors, 3 DIR. & BoARDs 49, 52 (1979). See Cohen, The Outside
Director - Selection, Responsibilities and Contribution to the Public Corporation, 34 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 837 (1977); Soderquist, Toward a More Effective Corporate Board: Reexamin-
ing Roles of Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1341 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Soder-
quist].
I Ewing, Civil Liberties in the Corporation, 50 N.Y.S.B.J. 188 (1978); Manning,
Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 3 (1977); Moss,
The Crisis of Corporate Accountability: A Legislator's View, 3 J. CoRP. L. 251 (1978); Werner,
Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 388 (1977).
" See, e.g., Gubman, SEC Roundup:Developments Affecting the Director in 1978, 3 DIR.
& BoARDS 33 (1979); Sommer, The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Governance, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sommer]; Treadway, supra note 7.
" See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979). In Lasker, the Supreme Court held
that state law governs independent directors' authority where not inconsistent with the In-
vestment Company and Investment Advisors Acts, and is applicable to determine whether
statutorily disinterested mutual fund directors can terminate a non-frivolous derivative suit
against the majority directors and investment advisor. The Lasker decision is further reflec-
tion of the Court's recent restrictive reading of the Securities Acts. See Whitaker & Rotch,
The Supreme Court and the Counter-Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REv.
335 (1979); note 107 infra.
,2 See, e.g., Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible Man-
agement Conduct, 31 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Folk]; Schwartz, A Case
for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976).
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boards. The subject matter is broad in scope.'3 Hence, the discussion fo-
cuses on statutes and decisions" which appear of salient concern to direc-
tors of widely-held business corporations."' This means of organization and
analysis will provide a useful degree of synthesis and suggest why directors
may be forced into renewed familiarity with their common law duties and
liabilities, long de-emphasized due to concentration on securities-related
matters.
The Functions of Directors
In examining the duties and liabilities of directors, a preliminary review
'1 Critical articles about the duties and liabilities of directors are extensively noted in
the margin since the authors have for the most part necessarily eschewed detailed commen-
tary on the soundness of the statutes and cases discussed.
" Outside the scope of this Article are directorial liabilities which may arise under
several other important federal statutes. Considerable guidance is already available for direc-
tors of multinational firms regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 under which
the Justice Department and the SEC share enforcement responsibilities. See, e.g., Atkeson,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An International Application of SEC's Corporate
Governance Reforms, 12 INT'L. LAW. 703 (1978); Mathews, Functioning of Directors in
"Sensitive Payments Inquiries", 9 INST. SEC. REG. 83 (1978); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 and the Regulation of Questionable Payments: A Program, 34 Bus. LAW 623 (1979).
In the important area of antitrust liability, see United States v. Crocker National Corp.
422 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Cal. 1976); O'Leary, CriminalAntitrust and the Corporate Executive:
The Man in the Middle, 63 A.B.A.J. 1389 (1977). See generally GARRETr, ANTITRUST COMPLI-
ANC E: A LEGAL AND BusinEss GUIDE (Practicing Law Institute, 1978). In the federal tax area,
see Cromartie, Civil and Criminal Sanctions Applicable to the Corporate Taxpayer, Its Offi-
cers, Directors and Employees, 55 TAXES 786 (1977).
Directors also may incur liability under the environmental protection laws. See generally
Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties in the Ehforcement of the Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1978). As to civil rights violations, see
Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), 92 HARv. L. Rav. 470 (1978).
Regarding liability for criminal behavior generally, see Note, Criminal Sanctions for Corpo-
rate Illegality, 69 J. CRIM. L. 40 (1978).
"1 Certain precedents cited herein concern directors of financial, insurance and invest-
ment institutions. Their directors, however, have special duties and liabilities due to govern-
ing legislation which are not specifically addressed in this Article. See, e.g., Coombe,
Directors' Duties and Responsibilities: New Dimensions, New Opportunities, 95 BANKING L.
J. 634 (1978) (bank directors); Castruccio & Hentrich, Developments in Federal Securities
Regulation - 1978, 34 Bus. LAW. 1159, 1192-97 (1979) (directors of investment companies)
[hereinafter cited as Castruccio & Hentrich]; Ulbricht, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
c Corporation Conflicts of Interest Regulations - One Year Later, 33 Bus. LAW. 693 (1977)
(insurance company directors). Similarly, directors of non-profit corporations face special
problems not examined here. See Note, Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care Associated
With the Directors and Trustees of Charitable Organizations, 64 VA. L. REV. 449 (1978);
Article, Not-For-Profit Corporation Director: Legal Liabilities and Protection, 28 FEDERATION
INs. CoUN. Q. 57 (1977). Further, while many cases in the sections of this article addressing
state corporation law and common law involve directors of close corporations, these directors
may have certain responsibilities different from their counterparts in widely-held corpora-
tions. See, e.g., Jackson, Federal and State Securities Laws and the Closely Held
Corporation, 4 BLACK L.J. 85 (1975); Leech and Mundheim, The Outside Director of the
Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799 (1976).
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of the functions currently performed by boards of most publicly held corpo-
rations will be useful. While state corporation statutes characteristically
provide that directors "manage,"'" most directors perform considerably
different functions, 7 with "management" left to corporate officers.
Boards of directors generally advise chief executive officers, discipline
or constrain the actual corporate managers, and actually "manage" corpo-
rate resources only in those situations where officers have lost control of
operations.' 9 Although some boards "establish objectives, strategies, and
policies" and "ask discerning questions of the management," the majority
do not."0 This limitation of most boards to very general decision-making
and high-level supervision reflects the constraints of chief executives' pref-
erences for advisory boards,2' the scarce time resources of outside direc-
, See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (1969) (West);
N.Y. Bus. CORP., art. 7, § 701 (1963) (McKinney).
"7 MACE, DiRacToas: MYTH AND REALrry (1971) [hereinafter cited as MACE]. Professor
Mace based his findings on several hundred interviews with executives of corporations in
which the president and directors owned insignificant percentages of the corporation's stock.
Also, he mainly examined the functions of outside directors. Id. at 3-4.
Is See Conard, Mace, Blough & Gibson, Functions of Directors Under the Existing
System, 27 Bus. LAW. 23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Functions]. Managers decide on the
products to be made by the corporation, give orders to implement these decisions, supervise
compliance with their orders, report the results to the appropriate people, and hire, fire,
demote and promote personnel. Id.
In line with the direction of case law, the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act
(MBCA) in 1974 amended the first paragraph of MBCA § 35 to align it with the unquestioned
delegation requirements of today's corporations, particularly large and diversified enterprises.
The section in material part now states that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by
or under authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under
the direction of, a board of directors . . ." ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1976).
The draftsmen observe that "[b]efore the advent of the so-called 'outside' director, it
was not unreasonable to expect the board to be actively involved in the corporation's business
• . . [b]ut such involvement is clearly neither practical nor feasible insofar as today's com-
plex corporation, other than perhaps the closely-held corporation, is concerned." § 35 Com-
ment at 43. The draftsmen further state that:
It is generally recognized that the board of directors may delegate to appropriate
officers of the corporation the authority to exercise those powers not required by
law to be exercised by the board itself. While such a delegation will not serve to
relieve the board from its responsibilities of oversight, it is believed appropriate that
the directors not be held personally responsible for actions or omissions of officers,
employees or agents of the corporation so long as the directors, complying with the
enunciated standard of care, have relied reasonably upon such officers, employees
or agents.
Id.
1g See Mace, supra note 17, at 14, 23, 27. Subsequent research has largely confirmed
Mace's findings. See Bacon & Brown, Corporate Directorship Practices: Role, Selection and
Status of the Board (The Conference Board, Rep. No. 646, 1975). But see End of Rubber
Stamp, supra note 2, at 75.
2 Functions, supra note 18, at 36-37.
2, See Functions, supra note 18, at 24-25. Indeed, one prominent manager has plausibly
warned that if a board of directors should stray into day-to-day management functions, see
note 18 supra, there is "the danger of ending up with committee management on a part-time
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tors, 2 and recognition of the fact that boards increasingly dominated by'
outsiders do not and cannot actually manage day-to-day operations.
2
1
Directors' Responsibilities Under the Securities Acts
A major responsibility of the board, paramount in these inflationary
times, is to see that the corporation raises and maintains adequate capital.
The issuance and sale of equity securities is of course an important means
of raising capital. When their corporations engage in such transactions,
directors may be exposed to liability on a number of grounds under the '33
Act and the '34 Act.2" Although directorial liability is expressly provided
in only two provisions of these statutes,2 a variety of other directorial
basis and nothing could be more disastrous." Functions, supra note 18, at 41 (quoting Charles
B. Thornton, Chairman of the Board of Litton Industries, Inc.).
2 An extensive review of directorial time constraints concluded that "[tihe one indis-
pensible requirement for board membership is success at one's principal endeavor and suc-
cessful people . . . tend to be extremely busy. Outside directors of major corporations spend
between 150 and 250 hours per year on board and board committee business, including related
travel." Soderquist, supra note 8, at 1352-54. One commentator noted emerging demands on
directors and raised the issue of time expenditure as follows:
suppose you regard the role of the board of directors to be . . .in addition: (1) to
select and de-select the president - which, in most cases they do not; (2) to monitor
and evaluate and measure the president's performance - which, in most cases,
they do not; (3) to study and appraise company objectives, strategies and broad
policies, such as product line changes, capital appropriation, diversification moves,
labor agreements, and so on; (4) to ask discerning questions - which, in most cases,
they do not; and (5) to be responsible and accountable to all shareholders - should
not directors spend a great deal more time as directors?
Functions, supra note 18, at 37.
"3 See note 8 supra.
24 The courts do not expect outside directors to become involved in the day-to-day opera-
tions which are rather the function of corporate officers and middle and lower management
levels. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (quoting
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 5). Indeed, one court has indicated that directors should
not become so involved. See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand,
J.); Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Foil, 284 N.C. 740, 758, 202 S.E.2d 591, 603 (1974). Nevertheless
some boards have recently become quite assertive vis-a-vis top management. See End of
Rubber Stamp, supra note 2.
25 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976). The '33 Act is "designed to provide investors with full disclo-
sure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect
investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
195 (1976).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976). "The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities ex-
changes and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose egular reporting requirements on
companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges." Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
1 Under § 11 of the '33 Act, a director as such may be liable for "material" misstate-
ments and omissions in registration statements filed in respect to securities distributions
unless he can establish the so-called "due diligence" defense. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(2) (1976)
and 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976). See text accompanying notes 32-40 infra. A director's only other
1979]
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responsibilities and liabilities derive from those provisions which apply
equally to all persons, from the director's position as a "controlling per-
son," 8 as conspirator,2 9 and as "aider and abettor" of others' offenses2
0
Liability based on these grounds may be just as severe as that founded on
direct liability.
Federal regulation of securities transactions was initially undertaken in
the '33 Act. The '33 Act requires the filing of registration statements and
the use of prospectuses in the public sale of securities by an issuer or
controlling person. The '33 Act is the first statute to impose liability on
directors for "material"'" false statements or omissions in securities-
marketing communications, and imposes directorial liability under several
provisions.
If a registration statement is alleged to contain material misstatements
or omissions, directors, whether or not they signed the registration state-
ment,3" will usually be among those sued for damages3 by disappointed
purchasers under section 11 of the '33 Act. The principal defense to an
express liability is under § 16(b) of the '34 Act which mandates repayment of a director's
profits realized in improper short-term trading. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); see text accompa-
nying notes 94-105 infra.
2 The '33 Act provision for "controlling persons" is § 15. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976). See
notes 48-50 infra. A similar provision is § 20 of the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976). See notes
72-74 infra.
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). Section 371 generally makes unlawful any conspiracy to
commit an offense against or to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. See
generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Causes: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Idemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Ruder].
See SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1432
(1979). See also Ruder, supra note 29, at 620. See generally Note, 1978-1979 Securities Law
Developments: Rule 10b-5, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1978-1979
Developments].
31 Materiality is a fundamental yet slippery concept whose definition has been left to the
courts. Oft-cited cases have variously defined a "material" fact as (i) a fact which a reason-
able investor might have considered important in making an investment decision, Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); (ii) information an investor might
have considered important, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); (iii) a
fact which might reasonably affect value, S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); (iv) information to which a reasonable
person would attach importance in determining his choice of action, List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); (v) a fact which a signifi-
cant number of traders would have wanted to know before making an investment decision,
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); and (vi)
an omitted fact for which, under all the circumstances, there was substantial likelihood of
its assuming actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder. TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2), (3) (1976).
3 Section 11(e) provides that damages shall be the difference between the amount paid
for the security and (1) the value of the security at the time suit was brought, or (2) the price
at which the security was sold before suit was commenced, or (3) the price received after
commencing suit but before judgment [if such damages are less than those recoverable under
clause (1)].
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action under section 11 is that the director exercised due diligence in
meeting registration requirements. The diligence standard is higher for
violations occurring in portions of the registration statement considered
"non-expertised" (statements not made on expert authority) than for
"expertised" portions. As to non-expertised portions, the director generally
must prove that he made a "reasonable investigation" after which he had
"reasonable ground to believe and did believe . . .that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact.'
4
As to expertised portions, the non-expert director must prove only that
"he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe" that there
were material misstatements or omissions.-
The majority opinion in Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp.36 was the
initial effort to delineate the scope of directors' liability under section 11.37
Those found liable included the corporation's general counsel, an inside
director, who had prepared a faulty registration statement which the court
deemed as mostly a "scissors and paste job" from prior prospectuses .3
Subsequently in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,3' an attor-
ney, who was an outside director, was also found liable under section 11.
The Feit court suggested that a director's high level of personal expertise
may elevate his own due diligence standard. The director in Feit, though
3' Section 11(b)(3)(A)'s requirement of a "reasonable investigation" by directors creates
the due diligence duty. See generally Annot., Due Diligence Defenses Under 15 U.S. C. .'
77k(b) Dealing With False Statements Made in Registration Statements, 2 A.L.R. FED. 180
(1969).
(6 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C), (D) (1976). Directors have been reminded that expertising
can cover only limited portions of the registration statement.
It has been suggested that first proofs of company registration statements be
submitted in advance to the directors so that they may have ample time to com-
ment while changes can be made. (cit.) The most hopeful relief in this area for
directors is the indication that directors may rely on actuaries as "experts" as to
matters within their particular realm of mystery ... and to that extent escape
liability for statements made in registration statements on their authority. It has
long been clear, however, that lawyers are not "experts" within the meaning of the
securities acts and reliance on their advice would not absolve the directors from
liability.
Hershman, Liabilities and Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and Directors, 33 Bus. LAW.
263, 276 (1977).
38 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"See generally Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris
Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 1 (1969). The usefulness of BarChris "lies in its analysis and application
of section l's elaborate scheme of defenses, particularly its delineation of the standard of
care required from persons attempting to take advantage of those defenses." Id. at 4. See also
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200, 208 n.26 (1976).
Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In discussing
the general counsel-director's liability, the court stated that "[als the director most directly
concerned with writing the registration statement and assuring its accuracy, more was re-
quired of him in the way of reasonable investigation than could fairly be expected of a director
who had no connection with this work." Id. at 690.
11 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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not an officer, was intimately involved in the corporation's management.'"
Material misstatements are not the only way a director may incur
liability with respect to a registration statement. If no registration state-
ment was filed but should have been, a director may be liable under section
12(1),1' under which the purchaser may be granted recision" or damages
against "any person who offers or sells a security in violation of § 5."3
Although one's status as a "seller" may frequently be in dispute,44 liability
is practically absolute under section 12(1).11 A director will not, however,
be held liable unless he has taken an active role in facilitating an offering
which was not properly registered."
Whereas section 12(1) does not apply to transactions or securities ex-
empted from registration,4 7 section 12(2)18 applies to virtually all transac-
tions, exempt or non-exempt. Under section 12(2), the remedies of reci-
sion or damages may lie for material misstatements or omissions in verbal
communications or prospectuses" "aided and abetted" by a director. 0
40 Id. The Feit director "was so intimately involved in this registration process that to
treat him as anything but an insider would involve a gross distortion of the realities of
Leasco's management." Id. at 576. It appears that a director with particular legal or corporate
experience is especially exposed to § 11 liability because of his expertise. See Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1321 (2d Cir. 1973). For earlier reasoning, compare McDowell, Director's
Liabilities in Securities Transactions, 22 Bus. LAW. 76, 78 (1966). "[Ain outside director...
has a hard time meeting the burden of proof', for "[iun most cases, the outside director
makes no independent investigation of the corporation's affairs in connection with the...
registration statement"; "[y]et [his] standard of care... is the same as that for an inside
director-officer who has spent all this time and effort." Id. [emphasis added].
" 15 U.S.C. § 77e, (1976).
,2 See generally Bromberg, Curing Securities Violations: Rescission Offers and Other
Techniques, 1 J. CoaP. L. 1 (1975).
11 Section 5 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, makes various acts unlawful unless certain
registration and prospectus requirements are satisfied. Such requirements are not necessary
for securities transactions exempted under sections 3 or 4 of the '33 Act. See generally Pierce,
Current and Recurrent Section 5 Gun-Jumping Problems, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 370 (1976).
4' See generally Rapp, Expanded Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act: When
is a Seller Not a Seller?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 445 (1977).
,1 See Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973); Gridley v. Sayre &
Fisher Co., 409 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (D.S.D. 1976). Actions under § 12(1) quite frequently turn
on the statute of limitations. Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m, provides that a § 12(1) action must
be "brought within one year after the violation upon which it was based" and within "three
years after the security was bona fide offered to the public."
See Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1045, 1046-47 (2d Cir. 1969). In Katz, two
outside directors were held not liable under § 12(1) because one was not a board member at
the time of the violations and the other merely signed stock certificates in reliance on officers'
representations of proper compliance. The court concluded that § 12(1) is not intended "to
embrace a corporate officer or director merely because he has knowledge of a sale of unregis-
tered stock and [had] a minor role in facilitating it".
,1 See note 43 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
See generally Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and
How It Compares with Rule 10b-5, 13 HOUSTON L. REv. 231, 260-61 (1976) (suggestion that §
12(2) places higher disclosure requirements on seller than does Rule lob-5 of the '34 Act).
50 See Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See generally Note, The
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Defenses available to directors include that the misrepresentation was
unintentional5 or that he was not negligent in the matter.2
Any director who controls a person liable under sections 11 or 12 of the
'33 Act may himself be "liable jointly and severally" under section 15"53 to
"'any person to whom such controlled person is liable." Since control may
derive from "stock ownership, agency, or otherwise," section 15 imposes
so-called "secondary liability" 54 for a director who does not directly partici-
pate in the distribution of unregistered securities (section 12(1)) or mate-
rial misrepresentations (sections 11, 12(b)). Clearly, section 15 is of partic-
ular concern to inside directors, who must prove that they "had no knowl-
edge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by
reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist."55
Outside directors, who often are not knowledgable about disputed aspects
of day-to-day operations of the corporation, more easily qualify for such
no knowledge defenses than do insiders.
Posing proscriptions much broader than sections 11 or 12, section 17(a)
of the '33 Act5 regulates the offer or sale of any securities, exempt from
registration or not. Directors are covered by its anti-fraud provisions,
5 7
although the courts are split as to whether defendants are subject to im-
plied civil liability"' or only to SEC injunctions and criminal penalties.5
Private Action Against a Securities Fraud Aider and Abettor: Silent and Inactive Conduct,
29 VAND. L. REv. 1233 (1976); authorities cited in note 30, supra.
1' Innocent misrepresentations do not give rise to a cause of action because of § 12(2)'s
language "he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
[the] untruth or omission." See Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 829 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976).
52 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) (defendant has burden of proving his lack
of negligence and knowledge); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l. Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680, 695 (5th Cir. 1971); Gridley v. Sayre & Fisher Co., 409 F. Supp. 1266, 1273 (D.S.D. 1976).
See also Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (proximate cause analysis
of defendant's alleged negligence).
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
5' Some courts have held that § 15 is the exclusive source of secondary liability for
violations of §§ 11 and 12. See Russell v. Travel Concepts Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 95,230 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). Accord, In re Caesar's Palace Sec.
Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 378-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
55 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
s Section 17(a) makes it unlawful for "any person in the offer or sale of any securities
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or
property" through material misstatement or omission, "or (3) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser."
" Compare Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975) (private right of action
under § 17(a) exists); with Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155, 159 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). See generally Hazen, A Look Beyond the
Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64
VA. L. REV. 641 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hazen].
59 See, e.g., SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); Russell v.
Travel Concepts Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder) FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 95,230 (M.D.
Tenn. 1975). A '33 Act draftsman has stated that § 17(a) was intended only to provide basis
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The negligence of a director may trigger SEC injunctions and related ancil-
lary relief55 under section 17(a). However, recovery of damages by a private
plaintiff, where allowed, requires proof of at least a "wilful or reckless
disregard for the truth" by the director.6 '
Any person "willfully" violating the '33 Act or SEC rules and regula-
tions thereunder, or willfully making a material misstatement or omission
in a registration statement, commits a felony under section 24.62 While the
prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of a
"reckless disregard for the truth" may support a conviction.6 3 Directors
who become closely involved in securities transactions may take warning
from United States v. Natelli64 of their need to make reasonable investiga-
tions and not to ignore any irregularities discovered. In Natelli accountants
of a prominent accounting firm were convicted under section 24 for willful
misrepresentations in their work on the financial portion of a proxy state-
ment. On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of a partner
in the firm, holding that he could not "shut his eyes in reckless disregard
of his knowledge that highly suspicious figures, known to him to be suspi-
cious, were being included in the unaudited earnings figures with which
he was 'associated' in the proxy statement."65
for injunctive relief or criminal prosecution. Landis, Liability Sections of the Securities Acts,
18 AM. AccouNTANT 330, 331 (1933).
16 See SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); accord, SEC v.
Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Note, Scienter and SEC Injunctions
Actions Under Securities Act Section 17(a), 63 IowA L. Rv. 1248 (1978).
1, Several courts have observed that if a private action for damages is allowed under §
17(a) and scienter not required, the effect might negate the limitations on private recoveries
for negligence contained in §§ 12(2) and 15 of the '33 Act. See Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). A § 17(a) standard higher than negligence accords
with policy arguments forwarded by Mr. Justice Powell when the Supreme Court rejected
negligence as a sufficient basis for damage suits under Rule 10b-5. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). But see SEC v. Aaron, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
$ 96,800 (2d Cir. 1979) (legislative history of § 17 rebuts use of scienter standard in SEC
action); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Hazen, supra note 58.
62 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976). The sanctions are a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment
for up to five years, or both.
63 See Wall v. United States, 384 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Dardi, 330
F.2d 316 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
" 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
" Id. at 320. In United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 825 (1974), the court affirmed convictions causing imprisonment of two inside directors
and a public accountant for violations of § 17(a) and a mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341,
for willful misrepresentations in two prospectuses.
Section 20b of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(t), authorizes the SEC to submit evidence to
the Justice Department for criminal prosecution where willfulness appears present. However,
United States v. Fields, [1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,074 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) holds that the SEC cannot itself negotiate a settlement of a civil case while secretly
triggering Justice Department prosecution. The Fields court dismissed certain indictment
counts against corporate directors and officers that the Justice Department had based upon
evidence the defendants had disclosed to the SEC in an earlier civil investigation and settle-
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The basis of liability under the '34 Act differs markedly from that under
the '33 Act and thus expands the legal risks confronting a director. Plain-
tiffs frequently ground their actions on both statutes, seeking to establish
misrepresentations or omissions under the '34 Act, or defective registratiop
under the '33 Act." Claims against directors under the '34 Act are princi-
pally grounded on sections 10(b), 14(a), and 16(b), which pose broadly
applicable anti-fraud rules."
Probably the leading source of director liability in securities matters is
Rule 10b-5,11 an anti-fraud rule similar to section 17 of the '33 Act." How-
ever, Rule 10b- 5's strictures protect not only buyers and offerees, but
sellers as well.7" While the SEC is given express enforcement responsibility,
implied private actions have long been permitted for Rule 10b-5 viola-
tions7' involving securities transactions negotiated on exchanges, 2 over the
counter73 or privately. 4
Except where a director is directly involved in disclosures or non-
disclosures influencing securities transactions, his potential liability under
ment, arising from alleged violations of § 17(a) of the '33 Act and § 14 of the '34 Act (proxy
regulations). The SEC's evidence had been referred for criminal prosecution on the same day
an agreement was reached on a consent decree.
11 McDowell, Director's Liabilities in Securities Transactions, 22 Bus. LAw 76, 82 (1966).
61 At least three other '34 Act provisions provide express or implied causes of action for
which a director qua director may be liable. Section 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i, is an express remedy
permitting suit for harm caused by manipulation on national exchanges. See, e.g., SEC v.
D'Onofrio, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Directors of brokerage firms must be concerned with § 15 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o,
which proscribes fraudulent practices by brokers in the over-the-counter market and certain
fraudulent and financial practices of all brokers and dealers. See, e.g., Davis v. AVCO Corp.,
371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Further, directors as such may be liable under § 18, 15
U.S.C. § 78r, which permits recovery by persons who detrimentally rely on false reports filed
with the SEC, but poses difficult standards for the plaintiff to meet.
" Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978), is promulgated under § 10(b) of the '34 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
70 Rule 10b-5 uses almost the identical language of § 17 of the '33 Act, see note 57 supra,
but substitutes the language "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" for §
17's language "offer or sale of any securities." See 1978-1979 Developments, supra note 30,
at 940-44. It is now established that Rule 10b-5 indeed requires that damages be derived from
an actual purchase or sale rather than ancillary matters regarding securities. See Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
11 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
72 See, e.g., Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969) (held,
defendant corporation, major shareholder in Westinghouse Air Brake Co., violated Rule 10b-
5 by failure to disclose trading scheme whereby it purchased a huge block of shares and then
secretly sold them, thereby manipulating the market to freeze out a competitor and another
corporate shareholder). See also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
3 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
1' See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Schine v. Schine, 250 F.
Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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the '34 Act is secondary,7" and principally derives from the '34 Act's provi-
sion for "controlling persons" in section 20(a).71 While any active director
is subject to controlling person classification," Ernst & Ernst v.
Ilochfelder" holds that directors and other defendants in Rule 10b-5 dam-
ages actions are not liable absent scienter, which is an "intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud."7 Extreme recklessness by the director, however,
may meet this standard,"0 while mere negligence may remain a basis for
SEC injunctive actions against directors and other defendants.81
Under these standards, Rule 10b-5 imposes on directors responsibilities
to convey material inside information"2 as well as to inquire whether all
11 See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc). See also SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
71 Section 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t, of the '34 Act states:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of [the 1934 Act], or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constitut-
ing the violation or cause of action.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976). The circuits are split on what triggers § 20(a) liability. The
Third Circuit has held that § 20(a) liability may be imposed on those who possess the power
or potential power to influence or control another's activities, as contrasted with the actual
exercise of such power. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890-91 (3rd Cir. 1975).
The Second Circuit, however, has held that § 20(a) imposes "liability only on those directors
who fall within its definition of control and who are in some meaningful sense culpable
participants in the fraud by controlled persons." Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299
(2d Cir. 1973).
7' 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
7' Id. at 193.
' In Hochfelder, the Court declined to address whether reckless behavior may be suffi-
cient to impose Rule 10b-5 damages liability, 425 U.S. at 193, but categorically stated the
Court's unwillingness "to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct." Id. at 214. A
subsequent Seventh Circuit decision stated that reckless disregard for the truth would satisfy
Hochfelder's scienter standard. See Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 251 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). The Wright court defined recklessness in the context of a
failure to disclose material information as a "highly unreasonable omission, involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care . ..which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." Id. at
251-52 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla.
1976).
" Compare SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1978) (SEC must prove
scienter) with SEC v. Aaron, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800 (2d Cir. March
12, 1979) (SEC does not have to prove scienter). See generally 1978-1979 Developments, supra
note 30, at 935-37.
11 Directors and other insiders may be liable under Rule 10b-5 for making misrepresen-
tations to persons trading in the market, even where the director or his corporation are not
purchasing or selling securities. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). However, a director's liability for misrepresentations may arise
not only when the corporation issues public statements, but also when he discovers non-
public information, the disclosure of which is necessary to correct past incorrect corporate
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material corporate information required to be conveyed has, in fact, been
conveyed. Directors find little solace in judicial acknowledgment that
"Congress was quite aware of the 'agonizingly subtle' choices continually
facing directors when it passed the securities acts.
'84
Another '34 Act provision which may impose liability on directors is
section 14,85 which regulates the solicitation of proxies. Section 14(a)
makes it unlawful for "any person. . . in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe. . . to solicit. . . any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an ex-
empted security) registered pursuant to Section 12 of [the '33 Act] ."8 The
SEC's proxy rules can only be enforced by holders of such registered securi-
ties."
More specifically, a director may incur liability in this area of corporate
statements, such as misstated financial reports of past years, see Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F.
Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); or which is necessary to make past correct statements (correct
when issued) not misleading. See SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Further, a director may be liable under Rule 10b-5 for a complete failure to
convey material non-public information, as in mergers and negotiations for treasury stock,
even though no representations of any sort have been made by the corporation. See, e.g.,
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), supplemented, 135 F. Supp.
176 (D. Del. 1955), aff'd 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). However, no court has found directors
or insiders to have an absolute duty to convey all business secrets absent insider trading. In
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969), the court stated that "anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommend-
ing the securities concerned while such information remains. undisclosed."
n In respect to the director's responsibility to investigate, the courts draw a distinction
between the liability of directors who actually participate in a securities transaction and those
who do not. As to participants, the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur imposed a duty of
inquiry on participating directors in an action for injunctive relief holding that those helping
prepare a press release must exercise due diligence in ascertaining that the release was the
whole truth. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). A similar due diligence inquiry standard for participating directors must
be met in the negotiation of corporate transactions in securities, at least in actions for injunc-
tive relief. See, e.g., SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Van Horn,
371 F.2d 181, 186 (7th Cir. 1966). However, such inquiry duty does not yet appear applicable
to directors not substantively participating in securities transactions. In Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973), the court held that nonparticipating directors may
be liable only if they aided or abetted in the violations of others. Liability as an aider or
abettor requires a showing that another has in fact violated Rule 10b-5, that the nonparticipa-
ting director knew or should have known of the other's violation, and that the director indeed
gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the principal wrongdoer. See Landy v. FDIC,
486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally 1978-1979 Developments, supra note 30, at 911-23.
1, Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1308 (2d Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).
15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
s Section 12 requires registration of any equity security (other than an exempted secu-
rity) of an issuer having total assets exceeding $1 million, which are held of record by at least
500 persons. There are numerous exceptions, however, to § 12's registration requirements.
9 See Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 887
(1976).
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governance under Rule 14a. This anti-fraud rule proscribes proxy commu-
nications containing material misstatements or omissions.88 The Supreme
Court in J.I. Case v. Borak" held that both derivative and direct share-
holder suits are implied under section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9.10 A private
plaintiff probably must prove that the director's involvement was more
than merely negligent,9' and also establish his reliance on a materially
misleading proxy statement. The plaintiff must, of course, establish a
causal relationship between such statement and the action taken. 2 Direc-
tors are invariably named in Rule 14a-9 lawsuits since, in addition to
injunctive and other equitable relief, a court may order damages "to the
extent that they can be shown."93
Unlike Rule 10b-5's apparently different standards respecting inside
and outside directors as to inquiry responsibility,94 section 16(b)S imposes
11 Rule 14a-9 states:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or
oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circum-
stances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier
communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1978).
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
90 377 U.S. at 431. The plaintiff in Borak alleged damages resulting from a materially
misleading proxy statement and the defendant argued there was no implied private right of
action. The Court held that "a right of action exists as to both derivative and direct causes."
See also General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Minneapolis Shareholders Co., 69
F.R.D. 1, 3 (D. Minn. 1975); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm.,
354 F. Supp. 895, 903 (D. Del. 1973).
" In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected
negligence as a basis for liability for damages under Rule 10b-5. This decision arguably
suggests that future damages liability under § 14(a) may also require a higher level of culpa-
bility. Negligence, however, was the standard in most earlier § 14(a) cases. See, e.g., Gruss
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396, 1403 (2d Cir. 1976).
92 See In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Secs. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161, 191 (C.D.
Cal. 1976). In Equity Funding, the court held that a stockholder need not have bought or sold
securities on the basis of a false proxy statement as the gravamen of the claim was that he
was misled when he voted.
11 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389 (1970). Further, the Supreme Court
in Mills also held that once a cause of action has been proved, regardless of whether any
monetary recovery has been or will be forthcoming, the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees.
Id. at 389-97. See also Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (recovery can be had for damages to the corporation);
Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 513 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d 790 (2d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957) (damages incurred in compelling rectification of
deceptive proxy material); Miller v. Steinbach, 43 F.R.D. 275, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (permit-
ting amendment to complaint requesting punitive damages in suit alleging breach of fidu-
ciary duties and violations of §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the '34 Act).
" See note 83 supra.
95 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
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the same standards on all directors of reporting companies.9 Section 16(b)
informs all directors - as persons with "inside information" - that "if
you trade, pay over the profit."97 The subject of scores of cases"8 and exten-
sive legal commentary,9 section 16(b) is thus designed to recover insiders'
short-swing stock trading profits.9 9 Actions can be brought by the corpora-
tion or an individual security holder.'9 ' Plaintiffs do not have to show that
a director actually made a profit since his liability does not depend on
actual profits,9 2 and shareholder suits are encouraged by the right to attor-
ney's fees' 3 and the absence of a security requirement.' 4 The principal
defenses available to a director facing liability under section 16(b) lie
within the SEC's narrow exemptions. 5
" Section 16(b) applies to transactions in "any equity security (other than an exempted
security)" registered under § 12 of the '34 Act, and an issuer must register under § 12 if any
of its securities is listed on a national exchange or if any class of its equity securities are held
of record by 500 or more persons and its total assets exceed $1 million. See note 86 supra.
11 Woodside, Resume of the Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets and the
Commission's Legislative Proposals, 19 Bus. LAw. 463, 477 (1964).
"s For a review of recent § 16(b) decisions, see Castruccio & Hentrich, supra note 15, at
1202-06.
"1 See, .e.g., Hecker, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: An Analysis of the
Time When Insider Status is Required, 24 KA. L. Rav. 255 (1976); Weinstock, Section 16(b)
and the Doctrine of Speculative Abuse: How to Succeed in Being Subjective Without Really
Trying, 29 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1974).
I § 16(b) provides in material part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such ... director [referred to in § 16(a)] by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or sale and
purchase, of any equity security ... (other than an exempted security) [of the
issuing corporation being directed by the director and having a class of equity
securities registered under § 12] within any period of less than six months. . . shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part
of such . . . director . . . in entering into such transaction ....
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
"It Any security holder may sue on behalf of the issuer if the issuer fails to sue the director
or other insider within 60 days after being requested to do so, see, e.g., Dottenheim v.
Murchison, 227 F.2d 737, 740 n.4 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 919 (1956); or if the
issuer fails to sue diligently. See Molybdenum Corp. of America v. International Mining
Corp., 32 F.R.D. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The Molybdenum court allowed a minority shareholder
to intervene in an action by the corporation to recover short-swing profits where the share-
holder contended the corporation was dominated by the defendants. See generally Note,
Insider Trading: The Issuer's Disposition of An Alleged 16(b) Violation, 1968 DUKE L.J. 94.
'0 Disgorgement of actual profits realized would not be oppressive. However, "profit"
under § 16(b) may be computed by matching the lowest-priced purchases against the highest-
priced sales within the preceding or following six months. See, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) (judgment against defendant for $300,000
on basis of such method of computation, despite $300,000 actual loss).
I See, e.g., Snolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). In Snolowe, the court said that "in many cases ...the possibility of recovering
attorney's fees will provide the sole stimulus for the enforcement of § 16(b)." Id. at 241. See
also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970).
I See Truncale v. Blumberg, [1948-1952 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
90,470, at 91,498 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (no security for expenses since based on federal statute).
05 Pursuant to authority explicitly granted the SEC to exempt transactions, the SEC
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Directors' Responsibilities Under State Law
While directors are most attuned to their liabilities under federal stat-
utes, the legal foundation of corporate governance resides in state statutes
and the common law. In Burks v. Lasker,°0 the Supreme Court recently
reemphasized the demarcation between the Securities Acts and state cor-
poration law." 7 The Lasker court stated:
it is state law which is the font of corporate directors' powers. By
contrast, federal law in this area is largely regulatory and prohibi-
tory in nature-it often limits the exercise of directorial power, but
only rarely creates it . . . .Congress has never indicated that the
entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply
because a plaintiff's cause of action is based upon a federal stat-
ute.10
8
The corpus of a director's duties and liabilities generally is not reflected
in state corporation statutes, although some statutes provide lists of pro-
hibited transactions. Rather, most complaints asserting liability of direc-
tors under state law are grounded upon breaches of common law duties."'"
has promulgated various rules to exempt certain persons from § 16(b)'s liabilities, e.g., Ex-
change Act Rule 16a-4 (executors, receivers, issuers). Defenses unavailable to a director
include that the director did not use inside information, see, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595 (1973); or that the defendant acted in good
faith. See id. Nor is waiver a successful defense. See Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Giroux,
312 F. Supp. 450, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346
F. Supp. 1153, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), supplemented, 346 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
106 99 S. Ct. 1832 (1979). In Lasker, the Court held that state law governs independent
directors' authority where not inconsistent with Investment Company and Investment Advis-
ers Acts. The Court also concluded that state law is applicable to determine whether statuto-
rily disinterested mutual fund directors can terminate a nonfrivolous derivative suit against
the majority directors and an investment adviser. Id. at 1835.
101 Even prior to its decision in Lasker, the Supreme Court in a series of recent cases has
made clear its disapproval of expansionist interpretations of the Securities Acts into corporate
governance areas. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that Rule 10b-5 actions can only be
brought by purchasers or sellers of securities. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stroes, 421
U.S. 723 (1975). It has limited the definition of the term "securities." United Housing Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Proof of scienter rather than negligence is now
required in Rule 10b-5 damage actions. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
see notes 78-81 supra. The Supreme Court has declined to expand the scope of § 14(e) of the
'34 Act to include protection of unsuccessful tender offerors. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977). As well, it has held that "a breach of fiduciary duty by majority sharehold-
ers, without any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure" does not violate Rule lOb-
5. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
' Burks v. Lasker, 99 S. Ct. 1831, 1837 (1979). The holding in Lasker should be com-
pared with Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279, 1286 (5th Cir. 1978)
where the court held Idaho's takeover law invalid because it was preempted by the Williams
Act and was unduly burdensome to interstate commerce.
"' See Adkins & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20 Bus.
LAW. 817, 817-18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Adkins & Janis]. The authors observe that
because few jurisdictions have statutory standards for imposing liability, guidelines for direc-
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Certain duties are indeed listed in current statutes.10 However, express
liabilities are limited to violation of statutes similar to Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA) section 48, which governs legal capital mat-
ters."' This model statute imposes joint and several liability on directors
for (a) a declaration of dividends contrary to statute or charter restrictions;
(b) corporate share repurchases contrary to statute;"' and (c) asset distri-
butions to shareholders during liquidation without provision for repaying
corporate creditors."3
Obviously, these particular liabilities are of predominant concern to
directors of closely held corporations. However, directors of firms large and
small perform under the vague but universally stated general rule that
"the business and affairs of [the] corporation . . . shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors.""' While courts have settled
that a director is neither guarantor 5 nor insurer"' of the firm's success,
the cases generally have not identified specific management functions that
directors should undertake. However, the common law rubric does reveal
three forms of directorial duty: obedience, loyalty, and care or diligence.
The first of these duties has been largely of historical significance. The
duty of obedience derives from the familiar rule of ultra vires, that any
action taken by directors beyond the powers granted by the corporation's
charter is not binding on the corporation. 1 7 Whereas ultra vires liability
in recent years arose only from unauthorized acts coupled with corporate
injury,"' state legislatures have weakened this duty by allowing exceed-
tors' liabilities have largely been developed through case law.
HI The director's familiar statutory tasks typically include by-laws adoption, ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 27 (rev. ed. 1974); election of officers, MBCA § 50; approval of
mergers, MBCA § 71; sales of substantially all corporate assets, MBCA §§ 78-79; and volun-
tary dissolutions, MBCA § 84. These MBCA provisions have been substantially adopted in
a number of states.
"I The MBCA provisions for legal capital matters is a reflection of state law in this
regard. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.625 (1973) (unlawful withdrawal of corporate assets);
MD. CORP. & Assoc. CoDE ANN. §§ 2-315(c), 2-417 (1975) (illegal payment or return of assets
to shareholders); MICH. Cohip. LAWS ANN. § 450.1551(a) (1973) (unlawful distributions of
capital stock); and N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 719 (1963) (unlawful reduction of capital).
"M See In re Gribbin Supply Co., 371 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1974). In Gribbin Supply
the court held the rule expressed in MBCA § 48(b) also applied to a former director who
resigned his directorship and sold his shares to the corporation in a scheme to avoid liability.
"' If a corporation is rendered insolvent after corporate officers have divided the assets
among the stockholders, the officers may be held personally liable for the corporation's debts.
See Nevada Land & Mortgage Co. v. Lamb, 90 Nev. 247, 248, 524 P.2d 326, 327 (1974).
" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (CuM. Supp. 1977).
" It is settled law that directors do not personally guarantee corporate success or the
fidelity of officers and agents to whom the board has with due care delegated managerial
tasks. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891); Cutler v. Hicks, 268 Ill. App.
161 (1932).
"I See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891); McEwen v. Kelly, 140 Ga.
720, 79 S.E. 777 (1913).
1"7 One of the first cases in this area was Pennington v. Seals, 49 Miss. 518 (1873) which
held that diretors were absolutely liable for corporate injury sustained in ultra vires actions.
"I In A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, cert. denied, 346 U.S.
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ingly broad purpose clauses in corporate charters. Nevertheless, allega-
tions of ultra vires activity are frequently included in derivative and share-
holder suits against directors."' Further, the recent legislative propensity
to regulate private industry is revitalizing this traditional duty. This is
because actions claiming injury from corporate activities not authorized by
law, such as bribes of public officials, obviously turn on the rule of ultra
vires, 2 and a negligence standard may apply.'2 '
A director's second duty under the common law is that of loyalty. Most
state law decisions holding directors liable to their corporations involve
breach of the duty of loyalty. Basically, this duty prohibits a director from
pursuing personal interests in a manner injurious to the corporation.'2 2 The
courts frequently analyze obedience in terms of a "conflict of interest" with
the interested director bearing the burden of proof as to the fairness of the
challenged transaction.123 Such cases for the most part reflect liabilities of
principal concern to owner-directors of close corporations. The cases deal
with conflicts of interest in salary matters, dividend policy, recapitaliza-
tions, business dealings with a director or an organization in which he is
interested, loans to and from the corporation, business dealings with a
relative of a director, common directors, and interests in competing or
similar businesses.' 2' However, breach of the duty of obedience may also
impose liability on directors of widely-held firms where contests for corpo-
rate control spawn litigation.
Directors opposing an insurgent group are unavoidably faced with a
conflict of interest,' 5 and board actions to defend their control2 are often
861 (1953) the court used a "direct benefit" test, and held that a corporation may exercise
any power not expressly prohibited if the power benefits the corporation. Accord, Abrams v.
Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
"' Creditors, however, cannot be heard to argue breach of obedience. See Sutton v.
Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 836 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966). In Sutton the court held that even
though the director permitted ultra vires action on behalf of the corporation, an injured
creditor had no standing to argue breach of the obedience duty.
,20 In the past the courts allowed few defenses in holding directors personally liable for
ultra vires expenditures. See Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
In Roth an amusement company manager was held liable to the corporate owner for "hush
money" paid from corporate funds to officials to prevent shutdown for Sunday closing law
violations. Some recent decisions, however, have allowed introduction of the "business judg-
ment rule" as a defense to director liability. See Ella M. Kelly & Wyndham, Inc. v. Bell, 266
A.2d 878, 879 (Del. 1970). For discussion of the business judgment rule, see text accompany-
ing notes 168-79, infra.
12, See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
'22 As with the duty of obedience, the directorial duties of loyalty and due care or dili-
gence are owed to the corporation, and not to the corporation's creditors. See Fagan v. La
Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
' See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
33 Del. Ch. 293, 296, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952).
I2 Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Marsh].
See O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINorry SHAREHOLDERS (1975).
' One close observer has described the conflicting pressures on a corporate director
facing a tender or proxy contest as follows:
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suspect and vulnerable to judicial correction.' 7 A variety of defensive tech-
niques are available including proxy contests,'1 open-market stock repur-
chases 2 9 or redemptions,'39 freeze-out mergers,' 3' and the selective issuance
of additional shares.'32 Many lawsuits arising from control contests involve
close corporations, with plaintiffs claiming violations of the controlling
shareholders' so-called "fiduciary duty" to the minority.
However, there are several instances of personal liability to which a
director acting qua director may be exposed in control contests. Liability
arises on grounds that directors have breached their duty of loyalty by
using corporate funds to defend their control. For example, while neither
freeze-out mergers nor issuances of additional shares appear to involve
director liability (assuming no securities laws violations), '3 directors may
be liable for proxy fight expenditures funded by the corporation unless they
establish that the dispute is one of policy.'
4
Similarly, when faced with an outsider's buying of a large block of
The desire to retain ... control, when challenged by an insurgent group, may
involve the board's self interest in the compensation and perquisites attached
thereto, or may be entirely motivated by a belief in the unwisdom of the policies
advocated by the insurgents. It is impossible to command the directors in this
situation to avoid any conflict of interest, since it has been unavoidably thrust upon
them. And to suggest that they abdicate before every challenge would be ridiculous.
Marsh, supra note 124, at 60.
'1 Corporate "control!' is a frequently addressed concept, considered generally to repre-
sent the power entrusted within the board's management responsibilities. See Hill, The Sale
of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REV. 986 (1957). "The ordinary connotation of corporate
control, as something which is bought or sold, or used or abused, is a power of entrenched
management over an enterprise which is owned, at least in substantial part, by others." Id.
at 992. However, "[tihe holder of control is not so much the owner of a proprietary right as
the occupier of a power-position." Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212,
1215 (1958).
'" See Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus.
LAW. 883, 911 (1976).
'l See, e.g., Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966); Rosenfeld v.
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
' See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (purchase of shares in market;
followed by buy-out of dissident shareholder).
'" See id. See also Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960) (buy-out of
dissident shareholder); Martin v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 33 Del. 234, 92 A.2d
295 (1952) (buy-out of dissident shareholder).
'3' In Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), the court held that a business
purpose must be shown before a long-form merger may proceed with the result of eliminating
minority shareholders. Accord, Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 571 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (applying Georgia law).
"I See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Cummings v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964).
'3 See generally McIntyre, Shareholders' Recourse Under Federal Securities Law
Against Management for Opposing Advantageous Tender Offers, 34 Bus. LAW. 1283 (1979);
Proceedings of ABA National Institute, Corporate Takeovers - The Unfriendly Tender Offer
and the Minority Shareholder Freezeout, 32 Bus. LAW. 1297 (1977).
,3, See, e.g., Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Union Stock Yard Co., 337
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 169,
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shares or a proxy fight, directors risk liability when they spend corporate
funds either to redeem the outsider's shares or to purchase open-market
shares in competition with the outsider. In Bennett v. Propp, 35 a president
and board chairman without board approval spent some $2.3 million in
corporate funds to purchase shares after receiving a letter from an outsider
stating his intention to purchase a large block. The director was held
personally liable to his corporation for resulting damages. However, courts
haVe not held directors liable in control contests for such open-market
purchases, or redemptions, given proper authorization and persuasive
proof that the outsider's proposed policies would have harmed the corpora-
tion. ,3'
Among the three common law duties, the director's duty of diligence
may increasingly become grounds for damage claims. All jurisdictions re-
quire in various words that directors owe a duty of reasonable care and
diligence to their corporations'37 in performing their functions.' 38 This
duty's corresponding liability is now based upon ordinary negligence, a
standard violated more easily than the gross negligence standard employed
in several older cases.'3' A director's action or inaction is measured against
how a "reasonable director" would have performed. "' Sufficient care and
diligence was defined by the Supreme Court in Briggs v. Spaulding"' as
that "which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under
similar circumstances, and in determining that the restrictions of the stat-
ute and the usages of business should be taken into account.'
4 2
Most corporation statutes similarly define the director's duty of care
and diligence.' Several states track MBCA section 35, which states in
material part that:
[a] director shall perform his duties as a director, including his
duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which he
128 N.E.2d 291, 292 (1955).
i 41 Del. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
,38 See notes 129-30 supra.
,3 It has been held that the directorial duty of due care and diligence is owed to the
corporation and not to the corporation's creditors. Hence, creditors have no standing to sue
directors of an ongoing corporation on grounds they were damaged because the director did
not exercise care. See, e.g., Fagan v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. Civ.
1973).
'1' See, e.g., Wolf v. Fried, 473 Pa. 26, 273 A.2d 734 (1977); McDonnell v. American
Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying California law); Home Tel.
Co. v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd 489 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1974).
' See Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 411, 8 N.E.2d 895, 904
(1937) (directors acting in good faith liable only for "clear and gross negligence" in their
conduct). See generally Note, Liability of Directors to Shareholders for Negligence Under
American Law and Their Indemnification, 16 McGni L.J. 323, 333-34 (1970).
,,0 Morrison, Factors That Limit the Negligence Liability of a Corporate Executive or
Director, 1968-69 CORP. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 201, 209-10.
24 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
42 Id. at 152.
83 See generally Folk, supra note 12.
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may serve, in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under simi-
lar circumstances.
Because of the importance of MBCA section 35 to corporate governance
the section has drawn careful drafting attention, and its last amendment
and the accompanying comments are instructive. In the 1974 amendment
the terms "diligence" and "skill," found in some state statutes,44 were
omitted. This change was engendered by the scarce common law authority
defining these terms, as distinguished from the present term "care."' 4 5
Within MBCA section 35's definition of "care," the draftsmen have used
the term "ordinarily prudent person" to reflect the common law', and "to
focus on the basic director attributes of common sense, practical wisdom
and informed judgment.
'1 7
MBCA section 35's phrase "in a like position" indicates that the courts
should expect a director to use the care of an ordinarily prudent person who
was a director of the particular company." ' The use of the words "under
similar circumstances" recognizes, however, that the special background,
qualifications, knowledge, and expertise of a particular director may place
upon him a measure of care different from that placed on his dissimilarly
situated peers. 4' This "similar circumstances" concept has been modified
in some cases to mean the director's "personal business affairs."'' This
personalized standard has been criticized for injecting subjective consider-
ations into assessments of director liability.
15
Three other issues determine imposition of liability on a director if he
is found negligent. These are standing to sue, causation, and the business
judgment rule. Cases in which these issues have been resolved in favor of
plaintiffs can be roughly categorized as involving either acts or omissions,
namely, active mismanagement directly attributable to the director,"2 or
" See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.31 (1969).
"5 See Corporate Directors Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAw. 42, 44 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Corporate Directors Guidebook].
"' See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
Corporate Directors Guidebook, supra note 145, at 44.
"' Id.
"' Id. at 44-45. Compare text accompanying note 40 supra.
"' See, e.g., McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380, 383 (2 d Cir.
1974) (applying California law); Bellis v. Thai, 373 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd
510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 244 (D. Neb.
1972), aff'd 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973); Dept. of Banking v. Colburn, 188 Neb. 500, 505, 198
N.W.2d 69, 73 (1972). Professor Henn cites earlier cases measuring director negligence in
subjective terms such as "[w]hether the director is part-time or full-time, whether or not
he is being compensated, whether distant residence causes his absence, whether or not he has
special background, his health and state of mind ... [and] the nature of the business."
HENN, LAw OF CORPORaMoNs 455 (1970).
' Adkins & Janis, supra note 109, at 820.
' When the director has engaged in active mismanagement, the defendant-director is
primarily responsible for the injury. The question is whether the law will force him personally
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director liability for failure to supervise corporate officers.'5 3
As regards standing, the corporation itself may sue a director, share-
holders may sue derivatively or as shareholders, and even creditors may
bring actions in certain circumstances. Corporate suits against directors
for negligence are unusual"4 since the alleged wrongdoers remain in office.
Creditors may have class standing in bankruptcy'55 and individual stand-
ing where the director is responsible for negligent misrepresentations made
directly to the individual creditor.'55 Most complaints of directorial negli-
gence are brought by shareholders, who may gain standing either deriva-
to pay for his misdeed by labeling him actionably negligent for his carelessness. See, e.g.,
Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Uccello v. Golden Foods, Inc., 325 Mass.
319, 90 N.E.2d 530 (1950).
'1 In a suit against directors for corporate losses due to conversion by a corporate officer,
a New Mexico decision expressed as follows a director's liability for inattentive supervision:
Corporate directors are not personally liable for conversion committed by the corpo-
ration or one of its officers merely by virtue of the office they hold. To be so liable
directors must participate or have knowledge amounting to acquiesence or be guilty
of negligence in the management and supervision of the corporate affairs causing
or contributing to the injury.
Taylor v. Alston, 79 N.M. 643, 447 P.2d 523, 524 (1968). In this type of case the underlying
wrong is clearly actionable, the issue being whether the director who has done no intentional
wrong can be found vicariously liable. In Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1161 (D.
Kan. 1974), aff'd 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975), the court held that a director was not
vicariously liable for reasonable reliance on officers' representations since "[tlo mechani-
cally hold directors constructively responsible for the acts of their officers would. . . do harm
to the concept of corporate responsibility by deterring men of good character from becoming
directors." Also within this group of cases are decisions finding directors liable for injurious
actions taken in their unexcused absence from board meetings. See, e.g., Bentz v. Vardaman
Mfg. Co., 210 So.2d 35, 40 (Miss. 1968).
"I There are several cases applying the familiar rule that a corporation, as the legal
entity that most directly may be injured by negligent management, may sue its directors.
See Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d 162 (1962); Bosworth
v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901).
"1 The jurisdictions divide about evenly on whether to permit creditor suits against
individual directors for negligence. Compare Michelson v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1943)
(creditor class has no standing) with Skinner v. Hulsey, 103 Fla. 713, 138 So. 769 (1931)
(creditor class has standing). However, it appears accepted that, absent a statute, creditors
may not sue for directorial negligence occurring before the corporation became obligated to
them. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Kern, 122 N.J. Eq. 332, 341, 192 A. 48, 55 (1937). Likewise it is
clear that creditors qua class have no standing until bankruptcy occurs, since to that point
only the shareholders and the corporation itself have standing. Id. at 345, 192 A. at 53.
Creditors exercising class rights must bring their suit through the bankruptcy trustee. See,
e.g., Roach v. Reldan Trading Corp., 321 F.2d 42, 43 (2d Cir. 1963).
'" The individual creditor has standing where a director in privity has made misrepre-
sentations to him. See Hi-Pro Fish Prod., Inc. v. McClure, 346 F.2d 497, 498 (8th Cir. 1965);
Minnis v. Sharpe, 198 N.C. 364, -, 151 S.E. 735, 737 (1930). The director may also be liable
for negligently permitting another to make a direct misrepresentation. See Cameron v. First
Nat'l Bank of Galveston, 194 S.W. 469, 476-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1917). The courts are divided
on class versus individual standing where the director is found negligent where misleading
information is communicated by publication. Compare Grandprey v. Bennett, 41 S.D. 619,
172 N.W. 514 (1919) (individual creditor granted standing) with Cairns v. DuPont, 135 Misc.
278, 238 N.Y.S. 74 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (no individual standing).
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tively57 or individually.'
While affirmative and deviant director actions such as misappropria-
tion "'59 cause clear and immediate injury, normally damages from direc-
torial negligence are financial and indirect. For instance, whether money
has been unduly spent or not received may become evident only after some
time has elapsed.9 0 Particularly where damages materialize slowly, the
plaintiffs task is difficult. The specific directorial act or omission leading
to injury must be identified, and the plaintiff must prove that the director
thereby violated his duty of care and, in turn, establish proximate cause."'
Causation is not easily established in the negligent supervision cases.
To reiterate, the courts recognize that a board's fundamental responsibil-
ity is to supervise the officers who in turn manage the corporation on a
daily basis.' A parsing of judicial reasoning in supervision cases is not very
helpful because express causation analysis usually is present only where
courts find a lack of causation dispositive. Most often, knowledgeable and
closely-involved officers or employees, rather than the defendant directors,
are found to be the proximate cause of injury.83 On the other hand, in
"I Shareholder derivative actions against allegedly negligent directors may be brought
if the board has not actively protected the corporation's interests. See, e.g., Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 319 (1936).
In Direct shareholder suits against directors are allowed in three classes of cases. The
first includes actions brought after the corporation is defunct. See, e.g., Word v. Union Bank
& Trust Co., 111 Mont. 279, 283, 107 P.2d 1083, 1086-87 (1940). The second includes actions
in which the defendant directors are themselves substantial shareholders and the plaintiff
seeks to prevent their joining in any recovery. See Perlman v. Feldman, 219.F.2d 173, 178
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). The third includes actions brought by sharehold-
ers individually injured by a misrepresentation for which a director is responsible. See, e.g.,
Coronado Dev. Corp. v. Millikin, 175 Misc. 1, 5, 22 N.Y.S.2d 670, 675 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Stinnett v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 37 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Tex. Com. App. 1931).
"I See, e.g., Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171 S.E. 501 (1933); Mercer v. Dunscomb,
110 Cal. App. 28, 293 P. 836 (1930). Misappropriation cases of course are within the group of
"active mismanagement" cases. See note 152 supra.
Io See, e.g., Hi-Pro Fish Prod., Inc. v. McClure, 346 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1965). See also
cases cited in note 151 supra.
6I The burden of showing the causal relationship between the director's failure to exer-
cise care and the corporate injury or loss is on the plaintiff. See, e.g., Polon v. Huffines, 446
F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1971). A frequently cited analysis of the causation required for director
negligence liability is Allied Freightways v. Choltin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950). In
Cholfin, the passive director of a company managed by her husband was held personally
liable for misspent corporate funds which benefitted her personally. However, she was not
liable for other misspending since she was ignorant of her husband's business defalcations.
Id. at 767. In Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), Judge Hand held that
proximate cause was not established when it could not be shown that intervention by the
defendant-director could have prevented harm caused by general mismanagement. See also
Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd 510 F.2d 969 (3rd Cir. 1975); Chasin v.
Gluck, 282 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1971):
I" See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
In The cases discussing causation present an almost uniform array of victories for defen-
dant directors. See, e.g., Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1944), aff'd 324 U.S. 200
(1945); Holand v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69. 376 P.2d 162 (1962); Hatha-
way v. Huntley, 284 Mass. 587, 188 N.E. 616 (1933).
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numerous cases involving facts similar to those present in such non-
liability cases, plaintiffs have prevailed against directors. Causation, how-
ever, is infrequently addressed in these cases, even though the courts de-
scribe the director's carelessness in terms implying an underlying causa-
tion analysis.'"' Perhaps the clearest guidance from these negligent super-
vision cases is that a director who exercises care and diligence will not be
held liable because he is unskilled,' 5 but his lack of skill or competence is
no defense to a claim based upon alleged negligence.'
The third issue special to the duty of care cases is whether the business
judgment rule may serve the director as a defense. The courts are split as
to the nature and effect of this rule,"7 which may absolve the director from
liability for exercises of judgment made in good faith. 68 By its very defini-
tion, however, the rule provides no defense to a director charged with
omission, a failure to exercise his judgment.' Some courts have used the
business judgment rule as a rationale for imposing liability only upon a
showing of gross negligence, omitting a reasonableness standard and re-
quiring only good faith.1Y0 Other cases cite the rule as a verbalization of a
"I See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Crews
v. Garber, 188 Okla. 570, 111 P.2d 1080 (1941). In Whitfield v. Kern, 122 N.J. Eq. 332, 192
A. 48 (1937), a New Jersey court did not discuss causation as such but found directorial
liability for negligent "acquiesence" in actions by other members of management that clearly
caused injury to the corporation. Id. at -, 192 A. at'56. Formal causation analysis was also
missing in Vujacich v. Southern Commercial Co., 21 Cal. App. 439, 132 P. 80 (1913), where
a director was held liable for damages for negligence in failing to show "that she could not
have obtained'[fore-knowledge of a misappropriation] by the exercise of ordinary diligence
as a director." Id. at -, 132 P. at 81.
"I Some statutes and cases, however, include "skill" in their statement of qualities that
directors should have. See, e.g., Keck Enterprises, Inc., v. Braunschweiger, 108 F. Supp. 925,
927 (S.D. Cal. 1952) ("care, skill and diligence in transacting the corporate business"). In
practice, however, the courts may make allowance for varying "skills" but not for lack of
diligence and care. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 86, 188 A.2d
125, 130 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
"I6 In Allied Freightways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950), the court
acknowledged that the skills of the defendant director ran to being a housewife, rather than
a corporate director. The court was concerned that Mrs. Cholfin did not diligently learn about
the corporation nor exercise care in at least attempting to review and understand its books.
Id. at -, 91 N.E.2d at 768. The import of this and many other director negligence cases is
that if Mrs. Cholfin had done so she would not have been negligent.
,17 See generally Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 367-71
(1965).
19 The principle that directors should not be personally liable in tort for "mere errors of
judgment" is long-standing. See Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 603 (1857); Security
Trust Co. v. Dabney, - Ky. -, 372 S.W.2d 401, 406 (1963). The law recognizes that the
director is not an insurer of his. corporation's success, that business necessarily involves risk-
taking, and that some errors of judgment are inevitable. See Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 179 Misc. 202, 204, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd 267 App. Div. 890, 47
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
"' See, e.g., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania Ry., 61 F. Supp. 905 (D. Pa. 1945), aff'd 155
F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Loyer, Negligent Management of Corporations, 9 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rv.
554, 558 (1960).
170 A significant number of cases have applied the business judgment principle to con-
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finding that the director had not breached the ordinary negligence -stan-
dard.'7 ' The best reasoned cases, however, expressly hold that the business
judgment rule protects only reasonable judgments, and ordinary negli-
gence is the standard. In Casey v. Woodruff, 17 2 a derivative action involving
a bond issue by the Erie Railroad, the court stated:
[a] director cannot close his eyes to what is going on about him
in the conduct of the business of the corporation and have it said
that he is exercising business judgment. Courts have properly de-
cided to give directors a wide latitude in the management of the
affairs of a corporation provided always that judgment, and that
means an honest, unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by
them."3
Several cases clearly indicate that a director has not closed his eyes if
he has sought and received information which contributes to the reasona-
ble exercise of his judgment. Accordingly, a director's care in the perform-
ance of his responsibilities can be shown by his proven reliance on reports
from officers,'74 accountants,175 the advice of counsel, 7 ' and from a properly
authorized committee of the board upon which he does not serve. 7 The
director must establish, however, that his reliance was itself reasonable.
7 8
done absurdly gross errors of judgment made in good faith. An early case in this regard is
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872), which held that directors are "not liable for mistakes
of judgment, even though they may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous,
provided they are honest." More recently, in Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, - Ky. _
372 S.W.2d 401, 406 (1963), the court stated that "[a]ll of the allegations . . . address
themselves to the matter of business judgement [and] [a]bsent fraud ... the courts will
not interfere with the management of a private corporation." See also Fielding v. Allen, 99
F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 181 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1950); Holland v. American Founders
Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d 162 (1962); Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 284 A.2d
605 (1971).
'"' See, e.g., Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212, 73 So.2d 747 (1954); Spaulding v. Hotchkiss,
62 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Williams v. Fidelity Loan & Say. Co., 142 Va. 43, 128 S.E.
615 (1925).
172 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
1 Id., 49 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
' In Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974), the court held a director
was not liable for officers' acts since "[a]bsent notice of suspicious circumstances ... [the]
defendant was entitled to rely on those officers, and he cannot be held liable for failing to
assume their responsibilities or engage in an exhaustive independent examination of the
corporation's business transactions." Id. at 1164. See also Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524
(1920).
"I See Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 244 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd 473
F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973); Pool v. Pool, 22 So. 2d 131, 133 (La. App. 1945); Epstein v. Schenck,
35 N.Y.S.2d 969, 980-81 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
See Spirit v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).
" MBCA § 35, supra note 110.
' If the director learns of irregularities or of adverse information relating to corporate
affairs, he-must take appropriate action or risk liability for any consequent inaction. See
McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying Cali-
fornia law); Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938) (applying Kentucky law). A
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Conclusion
Recent Supreme Court decisions have limited the efforts of private
plaintiffs and the SEC to extend the Securities Acts into many corporate
governance matters marginally associated with securities. 7 " As the Su-
preme Court pointed out in the recent Lasker decision, state law remains
"the font of corporate directors' powers."'' 0 Furthermore, directors' fears
of personal liability in securities matters have been lessened by the ruling
in Hochfelder"sI that more than mere negligence must be proven in damage
suits brought under Rule 10b-5.
Although directors' responsibilities in securities matters are and will
remain formidable and somewhat evolutionary, 82 the demarcation of
directors' liabilities is at least being refined by the ongoing stream of deci-
sions applying the Securities Acts. Directors may expect an increasing
number of complaints alleging breaches of their common law duties of
obedience, "' loyalty,' care and diligence.' As indicated above, these du-
ties pose significant liabilities and afford effective remedies under state law
to those complaining of director misconduct.
An expectation of increased litigation against directors under state law
follows from the combined pressures of the Supreme Court's decisions
relegating to the state courts many corporate governance controversies,
and SEC enforcement actions which focus on the role of directors. A nota-
ble indication of the first impetus is found in the opinion of the Delaware
Supreme Court in Singer v. Magnavox. 6 Holding that a business purpose
must be shown for a long-form merger that eliminated minority sharehold-
ers,1 7 the state court expressly acknowledged a Supreme Court suggestion
in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green' that state courts should resolve issues
in majority-minority stockholder relationships.8 9
well-known corporate law principle states that a director generally can avoid personal liability
for improper activities by informing other directors of the impropriety and proposing and
voting for a proper course of action. See, e.g., Vujacich v. Southern Commercial Co., 21 Cal.
App. 439, - 132 P. 80, 81 (1913).
" See text accompanying notes 106-08 supra.
'e Burks v. Lasker, 99 S. Ct. 1831, 1837 (1979).
181 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See text accompanying notes 68-84
supra.
"1 See text accompanying notes 25-105 supra.
"8 See text accompanying notes 117-21 supra.
I" See text accompanying notes 122-36 supra.
16 See text accompanying notes 137-78 supra.
"8 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
117 Id. at 979. See generally Goldman & Wolfe, In Reponse to A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 36 WASH. & Le L. REv. 683 (1979).
'- 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Green Court held that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority
shareholders, absent misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, does not violate Rule
10b-5. Id. at 476.
"89 Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 976 n.6 (Del. 1977). The Singer court's business
purpose test was innovative since, as the Supreme Court noted in Green, the Delaware law
had not required such a test for short-form mergers. 430 U.S. 462, 479 n.16 (1977). Other
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A second impetus to increased state law litigation against directors is
a strategic shift by the SEC in response to the Supreme Court's narrowing
of the reach of the Securities Acts. Followed closely by numerous private
plaintiffs, the SEC has recently moved vigorously into corporate gover-
nance matters. However, such decisions as Hochfelder and Green have set
unexpected limits on the success of private plaintiffs, whose efforts are
essential to the SEC's thinly-staffed enforcement activities. Accordingly,
through extra-judicial consent decrees the SEC has proceeded to lay a
better groundwork for litigation against directors under state law.
Private plaintiffs may be expected, in particular, to file more negli-
gence actions against directors for alleged breaches of their duty of care
and diligence. 9 ' A plaintiff's evidentiary problems in such actions'' will
have been eased by SEC consent decrees, which serve in varying degrees
as guidance for directors in all well-counseled corporations."2 Notably, an
increased specificity of director responsibilities"' and increased informa-
tion flow to directors"4 go directly to the reasonableness required by many
courts of directors who interpose the business judgment rule"' as a defense.
Business capital needs in an inflationary economy will keep boards of
directors acutely aware of the requirements of the Securities Acts. How-
ever, directors may also expect state law to become an increasingly impor-
tant point of reference in the coming decade, which means no relaxation
of the pressures on corporations and those who direct them.
Supreme Court decisions signalling plaintiffs of state laws' importance included Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). The Ash Court held that "[i]f ... state law permits corporations to
use corporate funds as contributions in state elections, ... shareholders are on notice that
their funds may be so used and have no recourse under any federal statute." Id. at 84. See
also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court held in Piper that a
defeated tender offeror did not have standing to sue for violations of § 14(e) by the target or
the successful offeror, as the claim in substance was for interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage and should be pursued in state court. Id. at 37-41.
90 See text accompanying notes 137-78 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 162-66 supra.
192 Former SEC Commissioner Sommer has concluded that "[i]t is through the medium
of [consent] settlements ... that the Commission has made its most notable inroads into
corporate governance and accountability." Sommer, supra note 10, at 130. Furthermore,
"[i]t is the implication of these settlements that will endure and influence corporations long
after the issues of political and sensitive payments have ceased to claim newspaper space."
Id.
"3 A number of consent decrees between the SEC and corporate defendants have resulted
in "settlements in which specific responsibilities, sometimes of an ad hoc nature, sometimes
of a continuing nature, are imposed on an existing board." Sommer, supra note 10, at 130.
" A long list of consent decrees have resulted in settlements "which require the appoint-
ment of an audit and/or other committee given special responsibilities," Sommer, supra note
10, at 130; "which require the appointment of a special counsel to conduct an investigation
into certain practices, id, at 130-31; and settlements which require "appointment of a special
auditor to assist in the work of special counsel." Id. at 131.
"I See text accompanying notes 167-78 supra.
1979]

